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Knowing, Unknowing or Believing? Epistemic Stance in Donald Tusk's Testimony in the Trial on the Polish Air Force Tu-154 Air Crash

Abstract

This article reports on a study into epistemic strategies used in the trial on the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 air crash which took the lives of many high-ranking Polish officials including the President of Poland. It follows the KUB model proposed by Bongelli and Zuczkowski (2008), in which three epistemic stances are distinguished: Knowing, Unknowing and Believing. Taking into account the political context of the trial, the study focuses on the ways in which the witness, Poland's former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, communicates his knowledge (certainty), unknowledge (neither certainty nor uncertainty) and belief (uncertainty). As the data reveal, when referring to the circumstances of the crash itself, the witness most willingly communicates unknowledge and belief while his declarations of certitude (knowledge) concern mostly procedural matters which are not directly related to the crash. As regards the explicit marking of (un)knowledge with the verb *wiedzieć* ('know'), both *wiem* ('I know') and *nie wiem* ('I don't know') are used rather sparingly. By contrast, phrases including references to the witness's memory (e.g. *to, co mam w pamięci* ['what I can remember']) – marking either unknowledge or limited/uncertain knowledge (belief) – resurface as the witness's preferred strategy. The data also demonstrate frequent co-occurrences of 'knowing', 'unknowing' and 'believing' markers, reducing the overall degree of certainty communicated by the speaker. In sum, the study reveals how Poland's former Prime Minister skillfully avoids unequivocal or categorical answers and conveys a low degree of certainty in his testimony.

Keywords

epistemicity, epistemic stance, evidentiality, Polish courtroom discourse, Polish Air Force Tu-154 air crash

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia wyniki analizy strategii epistemicznych stosowanych przez świadka podczas przesłuchania związanego z katastrofą smoleńską. W analizie wykorzystano model KUB (Bongelli and Zuczkowski 2008) zakładający istnienie trzech stanowisk epistemicz-

nych: Wiedzy (*Knowing*), Niewiedzy (*Unknowing*) i Przekonania (*Believing*). Głównym celem badania była identyfikacja środków językowych, za pomocą których świadek, były premier Polski Donald Tusk, komunikuje swoją wiedzę (pewność), niewiedzę (ani pewność, ani niepewność) oraz przekonanie (niepewność). Stwierdzono, że odnosząc się do okoliczności katastrofy, były premier Polski najchętniej komunikuje niewiedzę i przekonanie. Osądy, które można zaklasyfikować jako deklarację posiadania wiedzy (pewność), dotyczą z kolei głównie kwestii administracyjnych niezwiązanych bezpośrednio z katastrofą. Ustalono ponadto, że w zeznaniach świadka formy 'wiem' i 'nie wiem' występują dość rzadko. Preferowaną strategią okazały się natomiast odwołania do braku lub niepełnej pamięci (np. 'to, co mam w pamięci'), które sygnalizowały, odpowiednio, brak wiedzy (niewiedzę) lub ograniczoną wiedzę (przekonanie). W analizowanym materiale zauważono także częste współwystępowania znaczników 'wiedzy', 'niewiedzy' oraz 'przekonania,' obniżające ogólny poziom pewności komunikowany przez świadka. Reasumując, badanie pozwoliło na identyfikację strategii, za pomocą których w swoim zeznaniu były premier Polski zρέcznie unikał udzielania jednoznacznych odpowiedzi oraz komunikował niski poziom pewności.

Słowa kluczowe

epistemiczność, ewidencjalność, polski dyskurs sądowy, stanowisko epistemiczne, katastrofa smoleńska

1. Introduction

The communication of knowledge has long been an object of scholarly inquiry. Assessing the epistemic status of information – or else, the linguistic marking of certainty and uncertainty – has been the focus of numerous analyses of naturally occurring data. While psychologists centre on the speaker's mental state, discourse analysts examine its linguistic manifestation. In other words, they look at the various ways in which speakers lay claim to epistemic priority and negotiate alignment in interaction. This is all the more interesting in judicial and political settings, where – it may be argued – interactants consciously employ a wide range of strategies in order to display the desired degree of certitude or ambiguity.

Intrigued by the interplay between law and politics in a recent high-profile court case involving the former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, I have embarked on an analysis of his testimony which some commentators believe was a masterful political performance. Though no charges were brought against Mr Tusk himself, he testified amidst the accusations levelled against him by his political rivals, blaming him and officials in his government of the time for the 2010 Air Force Tu-154 air crash. Assuming that the highly politicised context of the hearing and the fact that it was broadcast live would have a bearing on the strategies of epistemic positioning pursued by Mr Tusk, I sought to examine the devices he used – while testifying under oath and, at the same time, addressing his political opponents – to admit to having certain or uncertain knowledge, or to having no knowledge at all. The analysis follows

the KUB model (Bongelli and Zuczkowski 2008; Zuczkowski and Bongelli 2014), in which three epistemic stances are distinguished: Knowing, Unknowing and Believing.

2. Epistemic stance revisited: Knowing, Unknowing and Believing

Although it may be stating the obvious, whenever speakers contribute to a conversation, they are driven by the desire to give or receive (i.e. share) information (Heritage 2012a: 79). How they value the veracity or reliability of the information, in turn, is a matter of their epistemic positioning. Put simply, *epistemic stance* (or *epistemicity*) refers to the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition being communicated and as such it is a linguistic notion rather than a psychological one. In the words of Biber et al. (1999: 972), epistemic markers can signal "certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or limitation; or they can indicate the source of knowledge or the perspective from which the information is given." Elsewhere, epistemicity is viewed as "interactional and linguistic means by which discourse participants display their certainty or doubt toward some state of affairs or a piece of information in their own turn, or in the turns of others" (Keisanen 2007: 257).

The degree of certainty or doubt projected in interaction depends on the source of information and the manner in which it was obtained. While for some, the indication of the source of knowledge – which, admittedly, is conceptually different from the assessment of this knowledge – should be subsumed under a distinct linguistic category, i.e. *evidentiality* (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004), others are inclined to encompass both the source of information (mode of knowing) and the speaker's assessment of the information under one notion, i.e. *epistemicity* (see, e.g., Chafe 1986).¹ It is the latter – broader – position that is adopted in the current study.

As is obvious, varying degrees of certainty or uncertainty are associated with a number of lexical and grammatical markers (see, e.g., Kärkkäinen 2003; White 2003; Martin and White 2005; Cornillie and Pietrandrea 2012; Nuckolls and Lev 2012). Given the recent profusion of studies into epistemicity and its various manifestations (see, e.g., Cornillie 2009; Aikhenvald 2018; Boye

¹ This understanding of *epistemicity* is not shared by all scholars. For instance, Boye (2012), who offers a functional-cognitive perspective on epistemic meaning, argues that *epistemicity* is a notional supercategory which consists of the subcategories of *evidentiality* and *epistemic modality*. In this view, *evidentiality* (or *epistemic justification*) is understood as the source of information/evidence/justification whereas *epistemic modality* (or *epistemic support*) is defined as the degree of certainty/degree of commitment (Boye 2012: 2). *Epistemicity*, on the other hand, receives the status of *justificatory support* (cf. Toulmin 1958: 112).

2018), it is hardly surprising that there is no consensus as to the degree of certainty/uncertainty that individual markers encode, especially if one considers the properties of these markers, their context-dependence, multifunctionality and the varied rhetorical strategies they serve. An alternative view is, however, offered by Zuczkowski and Bongelli (2014), who – taking a conversation-analytic perspective – propose that regardless of their surface realisations, the stances speakers take in interaction can essentially be reduced to three positions: Knowing, Unknowing or Believing. The Knowing position, as the authors argue, refers to what the speaker communicates as certain information basing on what he/she perceives (evidentiality) or deducts/infers (epistemicity). The Unknowing position, conversely, denotes the speaker's lack of knowledge or awareness of the information in question which is thus regarded as neither certain nor uncertain. Finally, the Believing position, it is proposed, describes the speaker's beliefs, opinions, assumptions and doubts or, in other words, all information that is possible, probable or uncertain, regardless of the degree of uncertainty that is being expressed (Zuczkowski and Bongelli 2014: 127–128).

That said, a caveat is in order here: the KUB model does not purport to account for what speakers actually know (epistemic status); rather it aims to describe what they *declare* to know (epistemic stance) in a communicative act.² As a consequence, intentionally misleading or deceitful communication – i.e. withholding the information one has to appear less knowledgeable than one really is or providing an untrue account of a state of affairs with a view to misinforming the listener – and the speaker's mental state or actual knowledge are not accommodated. It should too be noted that speakers may demonstrate high certainty and commit themselves to the truth of the proposition they communicate for manipulative purposes. Such examples abound, for instance, in high-stake encounters in political and judicial settings, where the knowledge displayed in interaction may promote or harm the speaker's interests. To explain how speakers employ a variety of markers to enhance their *credibility* in the eyes of the audience and to reveal the pragmatic motivations behind their use, the analyst needs to look at the interactional context and the co-occurring items. Admittedly, though, when applied in analyses of spontaneous interactional data, full of messy or incomplete sentences, false starts, redundancies and, finally, clusters of 'certain' and 'uncertain' markers, the KUB categories may not be as easy to assign as initially intended. Lastly, it may not

² As Heritage (2012b: 7) proposes, *epistemic status* is "based upon the participants' evaluation of one another's epistemic access and rights to specific domains of knowledge and information" and it differs from *epistemic stance* which is "encoded, moment by moment, in turns at talk." Lymer et al. (2017), however, question the usefulness of *epistemic status*, calling it "an unwarranted theoretical construct" and wondering "how one might gather evidence to support any particular assignment" of this status.

go amiss either that the degree of certainty of the whole utterance often differs from the degree of certainty inherent in the semantic meanings of individual epistemic markers (this will be demonstrated later in the article).

Notwithstanding the above, in what follows, I will look at how the KUB epistemic positions are manifested – and skillfully juggled – in Polish courtroom data, focusing on the linguistic choices made by the witness, who as a prominent political figure not only accounts to the judicial authority but also tries to defend (if not promote) his public image by demonstrating a low level of certainty regarding the circumstances that led to the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 air crash and consistently avoiding unequivocal or categorical answers.

3. Epistemic stance in Polish courtroom discourse: A case study

3.1. Data

The data used in this study come from a two-and-a-half-hour-long hearing in the lawsuit concerning the organisation of the official visit of the Polish President Lech Kaczyński in Katyń, where he was to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Soviet massacre of Polish officers in WWII. The lawsuit was brought against Tomasz Arabski, the head of the chancellery of the then Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk and it concerned his role in the organisation of the visit as well as his alleged responsibility for the Polish Air Force Tu-154 air crash.³ Donald Tusk, now the President of the European Council, testified as a witness before a three-judge panel at a Warsaw court explaining both his involvement in the preparation of the visit and the role of officials in his government of the time. Though no charges were brought against Mr Tusk himself, he seemed to have already been condemned by his political opponents blaming him for the air crash and trying to denigrate him in the eyes of potential voters. The hearing was broadcast live, with the press being present in the courtroom, and it turned into a political show. Mr Tusk answered the questions prepared by the counsel as well as the questions asked by members of some of the families of the crash victims. It is believed here that the circumstances of the hearing and, in particular, its highly politicised context, had a bearing on the strategies of epistemic positioning that Mr Tusk pursued.

³ The video with the hearing was accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_SZG-tOjODE (date of first access: 4 May 2018) and transcribed for the purpose of this study.

3.2. Analysis

Taking the KUB model as a point of departure, I semi-automatically analysed the transcript from the hearing looking for candidate examples which could be ascribed to the Knowing, Unknowing or Believing position. Given the purpose of the study, I focused only on the witness's turns with a view to identifying the strategies he pursued when making (*de facto* public) statements concerning his knowledge and I excluded from the analysis the contributions made by other participants. Again, it should be reiterated that – despite that fact that the witness testified under oath – from a linguistic point of view the epistemic markers found in the testimony could only be interpreted as the witness's *declaration* or *display* of knowledge and not necessarily as a reflection of his actual mental state. The overall aim of the study was to examine the linguistic expression of epistemic stance in Polish courtroom discourse (which, in this case, became public discourse) and, further, to create a taxonomy of KUB markers which would facilitate future analyses of Polish interactional data. In the ensuing analysis, for reasons of space, only selected examples are discussed (for a comprehensive categorisation of epistemic markers, see Appendix 1).

3.2.1. *Na całym świecie wiadomo...* – KNOWING position

As it transpired, the data yielded a fair number of instances where the witness laid claim to certain knowledge. These, it should however be noted, were not as varied and frequent as instances of Unknowing and Believing. It should too be stressed, more importantly perhaps, that these markers concerned procedural or administrative matters, not directly related to the plane crash. Thus, it may be argued, Mr Tusk intended to show his competence and knowledge of “how things are done” in politics. Still, looking at the specifics, the canonical marker of certain knowledge, i.e. *wiem*⁴ (‘I know’) was used rather sparingly (9 tokens). What is more, it tended to co-occur with some form of hedging or mitigation (e.g. *ale wiem* (‘but I know’); *no wiem, że [ale nie wiem]* (‘well, I know that [but I don’t know]’); *wiem z racji kontekstu* (‘I know because of the context’)). Two of the unmitigated examples of *wiem* are shown below. While in (1), *wiem* appears to be a neutral declaration revealing the speaker’s actual knowledge, *ja wiem* in (2), including the first-person pronoun *ja* (‘I’) foregrounds the speaker’s perspective.⁵

⁴ It might be added here that English *I know* may have two translations in Polish: *wiem* or *znam*. While the first form means “I know (that)” or “I have knowledge about something,” the second one means “I know someone/something” (cf. German *ich weiss* and *ich kenne*). In the data under study, both forms were identified.

⁵ Given that Polish is a pro-drop language, the inclusion of the first-person pronoun is not necessary (Polish verbs are marked for person). When the pronoun is, however, used, it is done for pragmatic purposes, e.g. to stress the speaker’s perspective and/or stamp his/her authority.

- (1) *Wiem, że Wysoki Sądzie to nie jest satysfakcjonująca odpowiedź dla tych, którzy wierzą że...*
 ('I know, Your Honour, that this is not a satisfactory answer for those who believe that...')
- (2) *Ja wiem kto odpowiada za różne części mojej wizyty.*
 ('I know who is responsible for different parts of my visit')

Other examples of Knowing stances included items whose inherent meanings denoted the speaker's conviction or lack of doubt (see Table 1). Consider the markers found in (3) and (4), which, in line with the KUB model, are to be taken as signs of certain knowledge. While they indeed may reflect the speaker's conviction, one should also allow for a divergent interpretation, namely that of an uncertain speaker excessively stressing certainty in order to convince a doubting audience (especially if objections are expected).⁶ It may also be the case that such items as *na pewno* ('certainly') or *z całą pewnością* ('most certainly') are just routinised stancetaking practices which do not necessarily convey a high degree of certitude.⁷ They also lose their strength when combined with 'uncertain' markers, as in the response in (4), where instead of simply saying *yes*, Mr Tusk produces a series of 'uncertain' markers, i.e. *znaczy* ('I mean'), *no* ('well') and *powinny być* ('there should be').

- (3) *Z całą pewnością to ma odbicie w dokumentach.*
 ('This is **most certainly** reflected in the documents.')
- (4) Q: *Ja rozumiem, że są notatki sporządzone z tego?*
 A: *Znaczy no z całą pewnością powinny być.*
 Q: ('I understand that there are notes documenting this?')
 A: ('I mean, well, **most certainly** there should be [some].')

Another subcategory of 'certain' markers identified in the witness's testimony included references to obviousness and common knowledge.⁸ Examples of such items are shown in (5) and (6), where – while invoking the shared epistemic background – the speaker obviates the need to provide the source of the information and, at the same time, seeks alignment and the audience's approval.

⁶ Cf. Halliday's (2004: 625) paradox that "we only say we are certain when we are not." This may be illustrated by the difference between the unqualified declaration *to jest w stosownej dokumentacji* ['this is in relevant documents'] (marking high certainty) and the qualified statement *to jest na pewno w stosownej dokumentacji* ['this is **certainly** in relevant documents'] containing a high certainty lexical marker which, paradoxically, may be a sign of the speaker's uncertainty.

⁷ In the data there were 13 tokens of *z całą pewnością* and they were all used by the witness.

⁸ A similar category is introduced by Bednarek (2006) in her model of *epistemological positioning*, i.e. "the linguistic expression of assessments concerning knowledge." In her view, bases of evidence include: "Perception," "General knowledge," "Proof," "Obviousness," "Unspecified," "Hearsay" and "Mindsay."

- (5) *ale **na całym świecie wiadomo**, że tego typu zachowania na pokładzie samolotu, czy przed lotem mogą doprowadzić do tragedii...*
 ('but **it is known worldwide/it is common knowledge** that this kind of behaviour on board a plane or before a flight may lead to a catastrophe...')
- (6) *Zdaje się i to przecież nie pierwszy raz i **wszyscy wiemy, znamy okoliczności** polityczne także tej wizyty.*
 ('It seems, and this is not the first time, and **we all know, we are all familiar with** the political circumstances also of this visit.')

The last two linguistic manifestations of Knowing to be discussed in this section include the unqualified declarative sentence and epistemic future. In (7), it is the very design of the sentence that suggests the witness's high commitment to the proposition. Adding anything apart from the proposition itself seems superfluous since by uttering these words, the witness avers the whole utterance, thus conveying an almost absolute certainty (whether it is objectively true or not is a different matter). On the other hand, the certainty of *powiem* ('I will say') in (8) is boosted by the co-occurring verb *podkreślam* ('I say'/'as I'm saying') which also conveys the speaker's conviction.

- (7) *Odpowiedzialne za to, gdzie i jak ląduje samolot, są służby.*
 ('Where and how the aircraft lands is the responsibility of the services.')
- (8) *te kontakty są częstsze, ale mają charakter taki **powiem** bardzo rutynowy podkreślam nie polegają na tym, że ktoś kogoś nie odstępuje na krok.*
 ('this co-operation is more frequent, but it is, **I will say**, very much like a routine, as I'm saying, it doesn't mean that one person follows another round all the time')

Summing up, the markers which signalled the Knowing position included the verb *wiedzieć* used in the first person singular or plural, as well as several other items pointing to the speaker's conviction or lack of doubt (for selected examples, see Figure 1). However, although the markers themselves marked high certainty, in some contexts, their interplay with less certain markers decreased the certainty of the whole utterance produced by the witness.

<i>wiem dokładnie, że</i> ('I know exactly that')
<i>mam świadomość, że</i> ('I am aware of the fact that')
<i>jestem przekonany, że</i> ('I am convinced that')
<i>nie mam żadnych wątpliwości, że</i> ('I have no doubts that')
<i>na pewno</i> ('certainly/for sure')
<i>na całym świecie wiadomo, że</i> ('it is known worldwide that/it is common knowledge that')
<i>z całą pewnością</i> ('most certainly')
<i>wszyscy wiemy, znamy</i> ('we all know, we are all familiar with')
<i>z natury rzeczy</i> ('by its/their very nature')
<i>jest oczywiste, że</i> ('it is obvious that')
<i>powiem</i> ('I will say')

Figure 1. Selected markers of the Knowing position identified in the data

3.2.2. *Nie mogę tego ani potwierdzić, ani ...* – UNKNOWING position

The Unknowing position turned out to be more visible in the data than was the Knowing position, especially in the utterances related to the circumstances of the crash. At the same time, somewhat surprisingly, the most obvious marker of 'unknowledge', i.e. *nie wiem* ('I don't know') was identified in Mr Tusk's turns only 14 times. All the remaining instances of admitting to 'unknowledge' were represented by a wide array of items, most of which included negation (see Figure 2). The utterances shown in (9) and (10) illustrate negation of a 'knowing' mental verb used in the first person singular, suggesting the speaker's strong identification with the claim being made.

- (9) *Szczerze powiedziawszy **nic nie wiem** o zapasowych samolotach.*
(‘To be honest, **I don't know anything** about back-up aircraft.’)

- (10) *...po prostu **nie kojarzę** w tej chwili tego, czym się zajmowali*
(‘... I just **cannot recall** at the moment what they were doing.’)

The example shown in (11), in turn, contains the object pronoun *mnie* ('me'), which, just like the possessive pronoun *mojej* ('my') in (12), indicates the speaker's greater epistemic distance. When contrasted with verbs in the first person singular, phrases containing object and possessive pronouns signal a reduced level of agency and as such, they may be seen as the witness's attempt to dissociate himself from the message conveyed.⁹

- (11) ***Mnie** na ten temat też **nic nie wiadomo**.*
(‘**I know nothing** about this, either.’)
[literal translation: ‘**Nothing is known to me** about this.’]

- (12) ***nie jest w mojej wiedzy nic**, co uprawniałoby mnie do oceny pracy...*
(‘**I am not aware of** anything that would entitle me to assess the work of ..’)
[literal translation: ‘**There is nothing in my knowledge** that ...’)]

Along the same lines, the impersonal structure in (13) acts as a distancing mechanism which allows the witness to attribute his lack of knowledge to objective factors.

- (13) *to też proszę sprawdzić, bo **tego typu rzeczy też umykają z pamięci***
(‘please check this as well because **such things also escape one's memory**’)

⁹ Consider the difference between *I believe* (= a high level of agency) and *it is my belief* (= a reduced level of agency) in English.

Another distancing strategy which the witness pursued was claiming – in lieu of a straightforward “I don’t know” – that he may not answer a question because of the manner in which it was formulated, as in (14).

- (14) *Wszystko, co na ten temat miałem do powiedzenia powiedziałem. Nie jestem w stanie na **tak postawione pytanie** dodać czegokolwiek nowego.*
 (‘I have already said everything that I had to say about this. I am not able to add anything new [in response] to a **question so formulated**.’)

Finally, by analogy to the Knowing position, Mr Tusk also deployed mental and communication verbs to convey his lack of knowledge, as demonstrated in (15) and (16), with the latter example illustrating epistemic future as well.

- (15) *choć **nie wykluczam**, że kiedyś miałem je w rękach, **ale nie mogę tego ani potwierdzić, ani...***
 (‘although **I do not rule out the possibility** that I once had the documents, **but I can neither confirm this nor...**’)
- (16) *Dzisiaj **nie powtórzę dokładnie** tego spotkania*
 (‘Today **I won’t be able to give a precise account** of this meeting’)

In sum, the Unknowing position was expressed by a large group of markers signalling varied degrees of commitment on the part of the witness. Mental and communication verbs in the first person singular represent the top of the scale whereas phrases with object and possessive pronouns alongside impersonal structures – the bottom of the scale. It was also quite remarkable that Mr Tusk seemed to avoid admitting to ‘unknowledge’ with the words “I don’t know.” Instead, he used a range of distancing strategies which pointed to a reduced level of agency and which seemingly excused him for failing to provide the expected answer. On the other hand, the witness consistently blamed his poor memory for not being able to recall the required details.¹⁰

¹⁰ In total, Mr Tusk referred to his (or one’s) memory 64 times. In the phrases containing the noun *pamięć* (‘memory’) or the verb *pamiętać* (‘remember’), he either stressed complete lack of knowledge (as in *nie pamiętam* (‘I don’t remember’)), *nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego* (‘I don’t remember anything like this’) or the fact that the knowledge he had was uncertain or limited (as in *jeśli dobrze pamiętam* (‘if I remember this correctly’), *według mojej pamięci* (‘as far as I remember’), *to, co mam w pamięci* (‘what I can remember’)). Most of these phrases expressed the Unknowing or Believing position.

nie wiem ('I don't know')
nie wykluczam ('I cannot rule out the possibility')
po prostu nie kojarzę ('I just cannot recall')
nie pamiętam ('I don't remember')
nie przypominam sobie ('I cannot recall')
nie znam odpowiedzi na to pytanie ('I don't know the answer to this question')
nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego ('I don't remember anything like this'/'I do not have it in my memory')
nie mogę tego ani potwierdzić, ani... ('I can neither confirm this nor...')
nie jest w mojej wiedzy ('I don't know'/'it is not in my knowledge')
mnie na ten temat nic nie wiadomo ('I don't know anything about this'/'nothing is known to me about this')
mi też nie jest łatwo ocenić, co pamiętam ('I also find it difficult to assess what I remember'/'it is not easy for me to assess what I remember')
tego typu rzeczy umykają pamięci ('such things escape one's memory')
nie powiem ('I won't say')

Figure 2. Selected markers of the Unknowing position identified in the data

3.2.3. *Chyba, jak sądzę, jeśli dobrze pamiętam...* – BELIEVING position

The last of the three epistemic stances was represented by markers which reflected the witness's beliefs, assumptions or conjectures (= I believe *p*), or doubts and unsupported claims (= I don't know whether *p* [or non *p*]) and which, again, were related mostly to the circumstances of the crash. The first thing to note is the absence of 'believing' mental verbs, with the exception of (*nie*) *sądzę* ('I [don't] think'). Contrary to what might be justifiably assumed, the witness's use of mental verbs to mark the Believing position was rather infrequent (see Table 1). Instead, as noted earlier, Mr Tusk repeatedly stressed the fact that his memory was incomplete and this seemed to be his preferred strategy during questioning.¹¹

As regards the most frequent 'believing' mental verb in the witness's turns, i.e. *sądzić*, it behaved in a manner resembling that of the most common English epistemic verb, i.e. *think*. When used in the matrix clause, as in (17), *sądzę, że* ('I think that') conveyed the speaker's strong belief. When used parenthetically, in turn, as in (18), *jak sądzę* ('..., I think,...') marked lower certainty (even more so given the co-occurring hedges *chyba* ('probably') and *jeśli dobrze pamiętam* ('if I remember this correctly')). Finally, when used as a neg-raiser, *nie sądzę* ('I don't think') signalled lower certainty as well (as in 19).

¹¹ This may be seen as a conscious evasive strategy designed to diminish the witness's responsibility or simply attributed to Mr Tusk's incomplete memory, which would also be understandable given that fact that the events described during the hearing took place eight years prior to the questioning.

Table 1. 'Believing' mental verbs in the witness's testimony

Mental verbs	Frequency
<i>myślę</i> ('I think')	2
<i>podejrzewam</i> ('I suspect')	1
<i>przypuszczam</i> ('I suppose')	0
<i>rozumiem</i> ('I understand') ¹²	4
<i>sądzę</i> ('I think'/'I am of the opinion')	14
<i>nie sądzę</i> ('I don't think')	14
<i>spodziewam się</i> ('I expect')	0
<i>uważam</i> ('I think'/'I am of the opinion')	0
<i>wątpię</i> ('I doubt')	0
<i>widzę</i> ¹³ ('I (can) see')	0
<i>nie widzę</i> ('I don't see') [non-literal meaning] ¹⁴	1
<i>wierzę</i> ('I believe')	0
<i>zakładam</i> ('I assume')	1

(17) *Sądzę, że organizacją lotu zajmował się pułk, ja się nie interesowałem tym, kto się zajmuje organizacją lotu.*

('I think that the organisation of the flight was being taken care of by the regiment, I was not interested in who was organising the flight.')

(18) *i tak należy zrozumieć wizytę Prezydenta 10 kwietnia, bo taką ostateczną datę przyjął, i zaproponował chyba, jak sądzę, jeśli dobrze pamiętam minister Przewoźnik jako datę tych uroczystości*

('and this is how one should understand the President's visit on the 10th of April because this was the final date approved and suggested by, probably, I think, if I remember this correctly, Minister Przewoźnik, as the date of the ceremony')

(19) *Nie sądzę, żebym wtedy znał te dokumenty, nie interesowałem się tą stroną mojej aktywności*

('I don't think that I knew the documents back then, I was not interested in this aspect of my activity')

¹² Interestingly, 11 more instances were found in the turns of other participants seeking confirmation of their assessments.

¹³ The verb *widzieć* ('see') allows for two interpretations: literal and non-literal. The literal meaning of *widzę* ('I can see') marks certainty, while its non-literal meaning ('I see'/'as I see'/'as I understand') marks belief rather than certainty. Consider two possible interpretations of the utterance: *Widzę, że nie jesteś zadowolony ze swojej pracy* ('I see that you're not happy with your job'), i.e. 1) literal meaning, direct evidentiality, reference to perception and to what the speaker can see with his/her eyes; 2) non-literal meaning, inferential evidentiality, the speaker's inference/evaluation. Similar observations can be made, for instance, about Russian *ja vizhu* or German (*wie*) *ich sehe*.

¹⁴ Only one instance of the literal meaning of *widzę* was identified in the data, i.e. in a description of out-of-the-courtroom reality (in Mr Tusk's clarification regarding his co-operation with an interpreter during interpreter-mediated talks).

Similarly, low certainty and little commitment were encoded in the phrases *wyduje mi się* ('it seems to me') and *wyduje się* ('it seems'), both of which represent the 'I believe *p*' variant.

- (20) *bardzo mi przykro że nie zawsze mogę tu służyć swoją pamięcią, ale wydaje się, że bezproblemowo można to po prostu stwierdzić*
 ('I am very sorry that I may not always rely on my memory here, but **it seems** that without difficulty one may simply ascertain this')

- (21) Wysoki Sądzie **wyduje mi się**, że problem powinniśmy *trochę* inaczej zdefiniować.
 ('Your Honour, **it seems to me** that the problem should be defined somewhat differently.')

The tentativeness of the speaker's assessment was also expressed by way of hypothetical sentences, as in (22), where Mr Tusk speculates that he would remember it if someone had warned him against flying to Smoleńsk. Speculative judgments can too be seen in (23) and (24), including, respectively, the approximator *gdzieś w okolicach* ('somewhere near') and the future form *to będzie* ('this will be').

- (22) *Ale nikt, ale na pewno pamiętałbym gdyby ktoś mówił... może jednak nie leć, bo...*
 ('But no one, but for sure **I would remember** it if anyone had said.. you'd better not fly after all because...')

- (23) *no trzeba ją lokować gdzieś w okolicach początku lutego*
 ('well, you should situate it **somewhere near** the beginning of February')

- (24) *To, co mam w pamięci to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń*
 ('What I can remember **that will be**, I think, the beginning of the year, probably January')

To sum up, the Believing position was reducible either to "I believe *p*" (e.g. *wyduje mi się* ('it seems to me')) or "I don't know whether *p* [or non *p*]" (e.g. *nie jestem pewien* ('I am not sure')). The most common markers included the mental verb *sądzić* ('think'), various constructions marking possibility or probability as well as phrases stressing the witness's limited knowledge, among which references to his incomplete memory were most visible (for examples, see Figure 3).

(ja) rozumiem, że ('I understand that')
myślę, że ('I think (that)')
nie sądzę ('I don't think')
..., jak sądzę, ... ('..., I think, ...')
wydaje się ('it seems')
wydaje mi się ('it seems to me')
jest możliwe ('it is possible')
jest prawdopodobne ('it is probable')
ale nie ma tu pewności ('but it is not certain')
musi być ('there must be')
to, co mam w pamięci ('what I can remember'/'[what I have in my memory])
nie jestem pewien ('I am not sure')
pewnie ('probably')
przynajmniej z mojego punktu widzenia ('at least from my point of view')
powołuję się na mój zdrowy rozsądek i logikę ('I use my common sense and logic')
chyba ('probably'/'..., I think, ...')
jakby ('in a way'/'as if')
jeśli mam w pamięci ('if I remember'/'[if I have it in my memory]')
pamiętałbym ('I would remember')
gdzieś w okolicach ('somewhere near')
jakieś ('some')
to będzie ('that will be')

Figure 3. Selected markers of the Believing position identified in the data

3.2.4. Co-occurrence of KUB markers

Given that in naturally occurring data epistemic markers tend to cluster, to see what work they really do in discourse, the analyst needs to consider them in a broader interactional context. When decontextualised, these markers can be easily identified as indexing Knowing, Unknowing, or Believing stances. In the environment of other epistemic items, however, they acquire new, pragmatic meanings which result from their interplay with the co-occurring elements.

This observation is especially relevant to the courtroom setting, where the discourse participants carefully craft their responses bearing in mind their accountability to the judicial authority and the fact that the testimony is provided under oath. In the case study analysed here, the witness deliberately creates an air of uncertainty and frequently admits to 'unknowledge,' as if trying to forestall future attacks from political opponents who might want to rely on his words uttered in court. To see this more clearly, consider the interactional sequences shown in (25) and (26). The witness's responses, though made up of divergent 'little' stances, create the overall impression of uncertainty, that is Believing. The great accumulation of 'knowing,' 'unknowing' and 'believing' markers within one turn appears to be a conscious hedging strategy through which the witness wishes to decrease the illocutionary force of the whole utterance. If, conversely, an affirmative response were provided to the confirmation-seeking question in (25), Mr Tusk would unequivocally admit

to being unaware of any disciplinary action being taken against his subordinates. As it currently stands, the circuitous response Mr Tusk gives may not be assigned a truth-value. In line with the KUB model, the question is asked from the Believing position, awaiting a Knowing answer, and getting a Believing one instead.

(25) Q: *Czyli odpowiadając na pytanie prokuratora, nic Pan nie wie o tym, aby osoby te były jakoś dyscyplinarnie ukarane za jakiegokolwiek nieprawidłowości?*

(‘So, answering the prosecutor’s question, you do not know anything about these people being subject to any disciplinary action for any irregularities?’)

[confirmation-seeking question – BELIEVING position]

A: *Zdziwiłbym się gdyby tak było, [B] ale Wysoki Sądzie mogę tylko powtórzyć, [K] ponieważ że byłem wówczas skoncentrowany na innych sprawach, więc ja naprawdę nie mogę wykluczyć, [U] że tego typu zdarzenia mogły umknąć mojej pamięci, [B] ale wydaje mi się mało prawdopodobne, [B] a na pewno ja nie miałem krytycznej oceny [K] i nie mam do dziś krytycznej oceny działań ministra Arabskiego [K].*

[BELIEVING position]

(‘I would be surprised if it had been the case, [B] but, Your Honour, I can only reiterate this [K], because back then I focused my attention on other matters, so I really cannot rule out the possibility [U] that such events could have escaped my memory, [B], but it seems unlikely to me, [B], and I certainly did not critically assess [K] and I still do not critically assess Minister Arabski’s activities [K]’)

[BELIEVING position]

In a similar vein, in (26), the witness masterfully avoids giving a succinct, straight-to-the-point answer and opts for something more convoluted instead. While meandering between Knowing, Unknowing and Believing ‘little’ stances, he succeeds, again, in conveying the impression of having uncertain knowledge. In this exchange, the question is asked from the Unknowing position, awaiting a Knowing answer, and getting a Believing one instead.

(26) Q: *Świadek niedawno na pytanie Pani mecenas, odnośnie czy był przeprowadzony jakiś audyt po śmierci Prezydenta i całej delegacji, odpowiedział, że byłby zaskoczony gdyby taki audyt był zrobiony, co świadek miał na myśli? Dlaczego byłoby to zaskoczenie?*

(‘Not so long ago, in the response to the counsel’s question asking whether an audit was carried out after the death of the President and the whole delegation, you [the witness] said that you would be surprised if such an audit had been carried out, what did you [the witness] mean by that? Why would you find it surprising?’)

[information-seeking question – UNKNOWING position]

A: *Wysoki Sądzie tylko to miałem na myśli, że nie zachowałem tego w pamięci, [U] więc byłbym zaskoczony, [B] bo pewnie bym o tym wiedział, [B] ale nie mogę tego wykluczyć [U] także ze względu na atmosferę tamtych dni. Też wydaje się, [B] Wysoki Sądzie, ale wiem, [K] że to nie jest moją rolą, ale to jest też chyba łatwe do stwierdzenia, [B] no bo z natury rzeczy to są rzeczy dokumentowane, [K] bardzo mi przykro, że nie zawsze mogę tu służyć swoją pamięcią, [U] ale wydaje się, [B] że bezproblemowo można to po prostu stwierdzić [B].*

(‘Your Honour, I only meant that **I couldn’t remember it**, [U], so **I would be surprised**, [B], because **I would probably know this**, [B] **but I cannot rule out this possibility**, [U] also because of the atmosphere on those days. **It also seems**, [B] Your Honour, **but I know** [K] that this is not my role, but **this is also probably easy to establish** [B], **since, well, these things are by their very nature documented**, [K], I am very sorry that **I may not always rely on my memory here**, [U] **but it seems** [B] that **without difficulty one may simply ascertain this** [B].’)
[BELIEVING position]

To sum up, what the above excerpts demonstrate is that how speakers communicate (un)knowledge in competitive or confrontational settings can sometimes be very complex and that the various degrees of (un)certaincy can sometimes be less-than-straightforward. This results from the pragmatic motivations speakers have and the perlocutionary effect they want to achieve.

4. Conclusions

Based on the foregoing study, several observations can be made. These have been summarised below.

1. The KUB model appears to be a useful tool for *conceptualising* epistemic stance in spoken interaction. It encourages the analyst to view individual lexical and grammatical markers as vehicles for Knowing, Unknowing or Believing. It conveniently proposes, on the one hand, the Knowing/Unknowing divide, and on the other, the Believing position, which subsumes the meaning of “believing *p*” (possibility/probability) and “not knowing whether *p* [or non *p*]” (uncertainty). Since the KUB model reduces epistemic stance to these three positions, it lifts from the analyst the burden of assigning varied degrees of certainty/uncertainty and possibility/probability. It should however be admitted that assignment of the three positions is much easier in the case of isolated or decontextualised items. Naturally occurring data, by contrast, abound in co-occurrences of ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’ markers, with speakers shifting stances within their turns. This makes the analysis more challenging, as the overall degree of (un)certaincy communicated by the speaker may differ from the degree of (un)certaincy conveyed by individual markers.

2. In high-stake encounters such as, e.g., courtroom hearings and political speeches or interviews, speakers may intentionally declare to know less than they really do or, conversely, create the impression of being more knowledgeable than they really are to promote their own interests. Since the analyst has no access to the speaker’s mental state at the moment of speaking, he/she needs to remember that the linguistic realisation is the speaker’s *display* of knowledge and not necessarily an accurate representation of their mental state. This should be borne in mind especially with regard to institutional settings

where the interactants negotiate their epistemic rights and epistemic priority, and where they consciously project the preferred self-image.

3. In the data under study, perhaps for the reasons described above, the witness chose not to admit to (un)knowledge with explicit markers such as *wiem* ('I know') and *nie wiem* ('I don't know'). Instead, he invoked his incomplete memory using numerous phrases with the noun *pamięć* ('memory') and the verb *pamiętać* ('remember'), all of which could be reduced to "I don't remember" or "If I remember *p* correctly." Thus, many of the utterances produced by the witness could not be assigned a truth-value. This – along with other distancing mechanisms (e.g. using structures with object and possessive pronouns instead of verbs in the first person singular) – allowed the witness to decrease the illocutionary force of his statements and thus to reduce his agency in the eyes of political opponents.

4. The data also revealed that mental verbs were not the witness's preferred way of expressing epistemic assessments. This applies not only to common mental verbs such as *przypuszczam* ('I suppose') or *podejrzewam* ('I suspect'), but also to the Polish equivalents of English *I think*, that is *myślę* and *sądzę*. With 28 tokens, *(nie) sądzę* ('I (don't) think') was, admittedly, the most frequent mental verb used by the witness; however, *myślę* ('I think') was identified only twice. This is in agreement with Wierzbicka's (2006: 37) observation that the "spectacularly" frequent English *I think* is much less common in other languages (e.g. German, Dutch or Swedish). Worthy of note is also the fact that while English *I think* functions like a discourse marker or modal particle (cf. Aijmer 1997), the Polish verb *myślę* does not. In the current study, it might be the case that the witness consciously avoided the high commitment encoded in verbs in the first person singular, and opted for such structures which indexed greater epistemic distance. Also, a plausible explanation for the virtual non-existence of *myślę* in the witness's turns, which is in stark contrast to his use of *sądzę*, is that *myślę* can be seen as carrying the meaning of "cogitation" while *sądzę* can be interpreted as "holding an opinion." Naturally, it is the second meaning that is more relevant to the courtroom examination context.

5. Finally, though it is a rather unsurprising observation, the study demonstrates that the communication of knowledge – and, by extension, human communication in general – is a complex phenomenon and that no single model of analysis can account for all its facets and realisations. This concerns also – or perhaps above all – the epistemics of institutional interaction.

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Appendix 1

‘Knowing,’ ‘unknowing’ and ‘believing’ markers in spoken Polish¹⁵⁵

EPISTEMIC STANCE		MARKER CATEGORY	SELECTED EXAMPLES FROM THE DATA ⁴
KNOWING (certain)	Grammatical markers		
		Unqualified declarative sentences	<i>Rozmowy między przywódcami, jeśli mają charakter formalny i są notowane, protokolowane, mają też rangę dokumentów.</i> (‘Talks between leaders, if they are formal and if they are being recorded, evidenced, they also have the status of documents.’)
	Lexical and grammatical markers		
	Declarative sentences	‘Knowing’ mental verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>wiem/znam</i> ‘I know’), <i>widzę</i> ‘I (can) see’ ¹⁷ , <i>pamiętamy</i> ‘we remember’)	<i>Wiem z racji kontekstu i wiem, z jakiego tytułu są one wymienione, ale nie kojarzę bezpośrednio z twarzą, czy z funkcją.</i> (‘I know because of the context and I know on what account they are mentioned, but I cannot recall exactly their faces or functions.’)

¹⁵⁵ This classification of epistemic markers in spoken Polish was inspired by the KUB taxonomy proposed by Zuczkowski and Bongelli (2014) and Bongelli and Riccioni (2018) analysing English and Italian data. The original classification has, however, been substantially extended and modified to suit Polish linguistic material. The list does not purport to be exhaustive.

¹⁶ Three comments should be made here: 1/ The examples come from the turns of all the participants in the hearing, and not just from Donald Tusk’s turns which were the main focus of the analysis; therefore, they include both declarative sentences and questions; 2/ To be properly interpreted, the examples shown for illustrative purposes should be considered in the original context in which they were identified. It should be stressed as well that since the individual epistemic markers frequently co-occurred, the degree of certainty/uncertainty communicated by the whole utterance resulted from the interplay of the co-occurring markers and, therefore, it often differed from the degree of certainty/uncertainty conveyed by decontextualised items; 3/ Most of the English translations provided include equivalent rather congruent structures, i.e. those that do not contain the same number and order of grammatical constituents as their Polish counterparts. They are intended as idiomatic (and pragmatically relevant) English equivalents of the Polish epistemic markers rather than verbatim translations.

¹⁷ Cf. footnote 13.

		<p>‘Certain’ communication verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>mówię</i> (‘I say’/‘I’m saying’), <i>twierdzimy</i> (‘we say/claim’), <i>potwierdzam</i> (‘I can confirm’))</p>	<p><i>ale powtarzam ono [spotkanie] było protokolowane</i> (‘but as I’m saying, it [the meeting] was being recorded’)</p>
		<p>‘Certain’ adjectives + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>jestem pewien</i> (‘I am certain/sure/positive’), <i>jestemy przekonani</i> (‘we are convinced’))</p>	<p><i>Jestem przekonany, że tak, ale od jeszcze raz powtórzę, Wysoki Sądzie, że rolę premiera nie jest znajomość tysięcy ...</i> (‘I am convinced that there was, from, but as I’m saying, Your Honour, it is not the role of the Prime Minister to know thousands of...’)</p>
		<p>Phrases with ‘knowing’ nouns + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>mam pewność</i> (‘I am certain’/‘I have certitude’), <i>mam świadomość</i> (‘I am aware (of)’/‘I have awareness (of)’))</p>	<p><i>...że z faktu, że mam świadomość, że minister Arabski był szefem kancelarii...</i> (‘... that from the fact that I am aware of the fact that Minister Arabski was the head of the chancellery...’)</p>
		<p>Negation of ‘uncertain’ verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie wątpię</i> (‘I have no doubt’))</p>	<p>NO DATA</p>
		<p>Negation of ‘uncertain’ nouns + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie mam wątpliwości</i> (‘I have no doubt’))</p>	<p><i>ale nie mam żadnych wątpliwości, Wysoki Sądzie, i prosiłbym o zrozumienie, że to w jaki sposób te mechanizmy działały, na pewno jest szczegółowo opisane w dokumentacji</i> (‘but I have no doubt whatsoever, Your Honour, and I ask for your understanding, that the way in which these procedures worked is certainly described in detail in the documentation.’)</p>
		<p>Impersonal structures with ‘certain’ adjectives (e.g. <i>jest pewne</i> (‘it is certain’), <i>jest niezaprzeczalne</i> (‘it is undeniable’))</p>	<p>NO DATA</p>
		<p>Phrases with ‘certain’ nouns (e.g. <i>istnieje pewność</i> (‘it is certain’))</p>	<p>NO DATA</p>
		<p>‘Knowing’ verbs + object pronouns <i>mi/mnie/nam</i> (e.g. <i>wiadomo mi/nam</i>, że (‘I am/we are aware of [the fact that]’)/‘it is known to me/us [that]’))</p>	<p>NO DATA</p>

		<p>‘Certain’ adverbials (e.g. <i>z całą pewnością</i> (‘surely’/‘certainly’), <i>na pewno</i> (‘certainly’), <i>bez wątplenia/niewątpliwie</i> (‘undoubtedly’/‘no doubt’))</p>	<p><i>i tam na pewno wątki te historyczne się pojawiały</i> (‘and there these historical themes were certainly present’)</p>
		<p>References to shared epistemic background (common knowledge) (e.g. <i>wiadomo</i> (‘it is known’), <i>wszyscy wiedzą</i> (‘everybody knows’), <i>wszyscy wiemy</i> (‘all of us know’), <i>oczywiście</i> (‘of course’), <i>z oczywistych względów</i> (‘for obvious reasons’), <i>jak wiadomo</i> (‘as is known’), <i>powszechnie wiadomo</i> (‘it is common knowledge’))</p>	<p><i>w tym sensie była to wiedza natychmiast publiczna i potoczna.</i> (‘in this sense it was immediately public and common knowledge’)</p> <p><i>no bo z natury rzeczy to są rzeczy dokumentowane</i> (‘because by their very nature these things are documented’)</p> <p><i>natomiast jest oczywiste, że w polskim ustroju politycznym urzędnicy państwowi są powołani do wykonywania funkcji wyłącznie w ramach prawa</i> (‘however it is obvious that in the Polish political system public officials are appointed to perform their functions only in accordance with the law’)</p>
		<p>Epistemic future (e.g. <i>powiem</i> (‘I will say’))</p>	<p><i>te kontakty są częstsze, ale mają charakter taki, powiem, bardzo rutynowy podkreślam nie polegają na tym, że ktoś kogoś nie odstępuję na krok.</i> (‘this co-operation is more frequent, but it is, I will say, very much like a routine, as I’m saying, it is not the case that one person follows another round all the time’)</p>
	Questions	<p>‘Knowing’ rhetorical questions (e.g. <i>Czyż nie wiemy, że...?</i> (‘Don’t we know that...?’))</p>	<p>NO DATA</p>

UN- KNOWING (neither certain nor uncertain)	Lexical and grammatical markers		
	Declarative sentences	Negation of 'knowing' mental verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie wiem/nie znam</i> ('I don't know'), <i>nie widzę</i> ('I can't see') ¹⁸ , <i>nie wiemy</i> ('we don't know'), <i>nie pamiętam</i> ('I don't remember'), <i>nie przypominam sobie</i> ('I cannot recall'))	<i>Nie przypominam sobie, aby przed lutym tego typu opracowania stały się co najmniej przynajmniej mojej lektury...</i> (I cannot recall such papers becoming, before February, at least, at least [I cannot recall] my reading...')
		Negation of 'knowing' communication verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie potwierdzam</i> ('I can't confirm'))	<i>Nie potwierdzam tej wypowiedzi</i> (I cannot confirm these words')
		Negation + possessive adjective <i>mój/moja</i> + 'knowing' nouns + (e.g. <i>nie jest w mojej wiedzy</i> ('not to my knowledge'), <i>nie jest w mojej pamięci</i> ('I don't remember'))	<i>nie jest w mojej wiedzy nic, co uprawniałoby mnie do oceny pracy</i> (I am not aware of anything that would entitle me to assess the work of... [literal translation: 'it is not my knowledge ...'])
		Negation of 'certain' nouns + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie mam wiedzy</i> ('I don't have any knowledge'/'I am not aware'), <i>nie mam świadomości</i> ('I am not aware'/'I am not cognizant of'), <i>nie mam w pamięci</i> ('I cannot remember'))	<i>Nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego</i> (I don't remember anything like this' [literal translation: 'I do not have it in my memory'])
		Negation of <i>móc</i> + first-person singular or plural + communication verb (e.g. <i>nie mogę tego potwierdzić</i> ('I cannot confirm this'), <i>nie mogę stwierdzić</i> ('I am not able to ascertain'), <i>nie mogę zaprzeczyć</i> ('I cannot deny'), <i>nie mogę wykluczyć</i> ('I cannot rule out [the possibility of/that]'))	<i>więc ja nie mogę wykluczyć, że minister Przewoźnik dopóki nie było pełnej jednoznacznej deklaracji ze strony obu kancelarii, mógł przygotować takie warianty</i> (so I cannot rule out the possibility that Minister Przewoźnik, as long as no all-encompassing unequivocal declaration was made by both chancelleries, that he could have prepared such alternatives')

¹⁸ Cf. footnote 13.


		Impersonal structures with ‘unknowing’ verbs (e.g. <i>nie wiadomo</i> (‘it is unknown’/‘one doesn’t know’), <i>nie widać</i> (‘one cannot see’/‘you don’t see’), <i>nie mówi się nic o</i> (‘one doesn’t say anything about’))	NO DATA
		‘Unknowing’ verbs + object pronouns <i>mi/mnie/nam</i> (e.g. <i>nie jest mi/nam nic wiadomo</i> , (‘I/we are not aware’/‘I/we know nothing [about]’))	<i><u>Mi</u> też nie jest łatwo ocenić, co pamiętam</i> (‘I also find it difficult to assess what I remember ’ [literal translation: ‘It is not easy for <u>me</u> either to assess what I remember’])
		Epistemic future (negation + ‘knowing’ verb) (e.g. <i>tego nie będę wiedzieć</i> (‘I won’t know’), <i>nie powiem</i> (‘I won’t say’/‘I don’t know’))	<i>Szczegółów sobie nie przypomnę</i> (‘I will not be able to recall the details’) Nie powiem (‘I won’t say’ = ‘I don’t know’)
	Questions	‘Unknowing’ questions with interrogative pronouns (e.g. <i>Kto?</i> (‘Who..?’), <i>Co...?</i> (‘What...?’), <i>Gdzie ...?</i> (‘Where...?’), <i>Kiedy...?</i> (‘When...?’), <i>Jak...?</i> (‘How?’))	<i>Wh-question [information-seeking question]</i> <i>Kiedy Pan powziął decyzję, że będzie uczestniczył w tych obchodach w Katyniu?</i> (‘When did you decide that you would participate in this commemoration ceremony in Katyń?’)

BELIEVING (uncertain) [I believe <i>p</i>] or [I don't know whether <i>p</i> (or non <i>p</i>)]	Lexical and grammatical markers		
	Declarative sentences	'Believing' mental verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>sądzę</i> ('I think'/'I'm of the opinion'), <i>myślę</i> ('I think'), <i>uważam</i> ('I believe'/'I'm of the opinion'), <i>rozumiem</i> ('I understand'/'I see'), <i>podejrzewam</i> ('I suspect'), <i>widzę</i> ('I see') ¹⁹)	<i>ja rozumiem, że świadek nie był nigdy w Katyniu</i> <i>('I understand that you [the witness] have never been to Katyn')</i> <i>Myślę, że termin „rozdzielenie wizyt” był terminem publicystycznym, czy politycznym raczej</i> <i>('I think that the description “separation of visits” was a journalistic description, or rather a political one')</i> <i>Ale widzę, że przedstawiciele rodzin są bardzo zdenerwowani, również mój mocodawca i chciałbym udzielić im w tym momencie...</i> <i>('But I see that the families' representatives are very upset, also my principal, and I would like to give them the right to, at the moment...')</i>
		'Uncertain' mental verbs + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>wątpię</i> ('I doubt'))	NO DATA
		'Believing' mental verbs + neg-raising (e.g. <i>nie sądzę</i> ('I don't think'), <i>nie uważam</i> ('I don't think'), <i>nie przypuszczam</i> ('I don't suppose'))	<i>Nie sądzę, abyśmy w czasie tego spotkania poruszali precyzyjnie możliwy przebieg takiego takiej wizyty</i> <i>('I don't think we were, during this meeting, discussing in detail the possible course of this this visit')</i>
		Phrases with 'believing' nouns + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>mam wątpliwość</i> ('I have doubts'/'I doubt'))	NO DATA
		Negation + 'knowing' nouns/verbs + <i>p1</i> or <i>p2</i> (e.g. <i>nie wiem, czy <i>p1</i> czy <i>p2</i></i> ('I don't know whether <i>p1</i> or <i>p2</i> '), <i>nie jest w mojej pamięci, czy <i>p1</i> czy <i>p2</i></i> ('I don't remember whether <i>p1</i> or <i>p2</i> '), <i>nie jest mi/nam wiadomo, czy <i>p1</i> czy <i>p2</i></i> ('I/we don't know whether <i>p1</i> or <i>p2</i> '))	NO DATA

¹⁹ Cf. footnote 13.

		<p>Jak-comment clauses (e.g. <i>jak sądzę</i> ('I think'/as I think'), <i>jak wierzę</i> ('I believe'/as I believe'))</p>	<p><i>I to, jak sądzę, ministra Przewoźnika skłaniało do tego, żeby szukać różnych wariantów</i> ('And this, I think, made Minister Przewoźnik look for various alternatives')</p>
		<p>Impersonal structures with mental and communication verbs (e.g. <i>sądzi się/uważa się</i> ('one believes'/it is believed'), <i>widac</i> ('one can see'), <i>wydaje się</i> ('it seems'/it appears'), <i>mówi się</i> ('they say'), <i>wydają się/zdają się</i> ('they seem/appear to'))</p>	<p><i>natomiast zaproszenie telefoniczne wydaje się w zupełności wystarczające z punktu widzenia praktyki</i> ('however a telephone invitation seems more than sufficient from the point of view of practice')</p>
		<p>Impersonal structures with 'believing' adjectives (e.g. <i>jest (wysoce) prawdopodobne</i> ('it is (highly) likely/probable'), <i>jest możliwe</i>, <i>że</i> ('it is possible that'))</p>	<p><i>dałem zielone światło urzędnikom, mówiąc, że, czy zakładając, że jest możliwe, prawdopodobne, że będę w Katyniu</i> ('I gave the green light to the officials, saying or assuming that it was possible, probable that I would be in Katyń')</p>
		<p>Negation + 'certain' nouns (e.g. <i>nie ma pewności</i> ('it is not certain'))</p>	<p><i>poza właściwie jednym stwierdzeniem, że prezydent Kaczyński być może będzie chciał brać udział, ale nie ma tu pewności, w uroczystościach.</i> ('apart from one statement that President Kaczyński will perhaps want to take part, but it is not certain, in the ceremony')</p>
		<p>Phrases with 'hearsay' nouns (e.g. <i>krążą pogłoski</i> ('there are rumours'), <i>były plotki</i> ('there was gossip'), <i>płyną sygnały</i> ('one hears'))</p>	<p><i>takie sygnały pojawiały się pod koniec 2009 roku</i> ('such statements appeared at the end of 2009')</p>
		<p>'Believing' verbs + object pronouns <i>mi/mnie/nam</i> (e.g. <i>wydaje mi/nam się</i> ('it seems/appears to me/us'), <i>mnie się wydaje</i> ('it seems/appears to me'))</p>	<p><i>więc w tym sensie, Wysoki Sądzie, wydaje mi się, że nie ma jakby, nie ma możliwości odpowiedzenia twierdząco na Pańskie pytanie</i> ('so in this sense, Your Honour, it seems to me that there is, in a way, no possibility of me saying 'yes' to his [the Prosecutor's] question')</p>

	<p>Modal verbs (e.g. <i>może/mogą</i> ('can'/'may'), <i>mógłby/mogliby</i> ('could'/'might'), <i>musi/muszą</i> ('must'))</p>	<p><i>ale na całym świecie wiadomo, że tego typu zachowania na pokładzie samolotu, czy przed lotem mogą doprowadzić do tragedii...</i> (‘but it is known worldwide that this kind of behaviour onboard a plane or before a flight may lead to a catastrophe ..’)</p> <p><i>Z całą pewnością musi być notatka z rozmowy...</i> (‘Most certainly there must be a note documenting the conversation..’)</p>
	<p>Phrases with markers of limited (uncertain/unconfirmed) knowledge (e.g. <i>wedle/według mojej wiedzy</i> ('based on my knowledge'), <i>o ile mi wiadomo</i> ('as far as I know'/'for all I know'), <i>z tego, co pamiętam</i> ('as far as I remember'), <i>mam w pamięci</i> ('I can remember'), <i>wiem tylko</i> ('all I know is'))</p>	<p>o ile sądowi wiadomo (‘as far as the court is aware’)</p> <p><i>te ostateczne decyzje to według mojej pamięci zarówno jeśli chodzi o mnie, jak i o prezydenta Lecha Kaczyńskiego, to był luty, a nie styczeń</i> (‘these final decisions, as far as I remember/[basing on my memory], as regards both myself and President Lech Kaczyński, it was February and not January.’)</p> <p><i>To, co mam w pamięci to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń</i> (‘What I can remember/[what I have in my memory] that will be, I think, the beginning of the year, probably January.’)</p>
	<p>Negation of ‘certain’ adjectives and nouns + first-person singular or plural (e.g. <i>nie jestem pewien</i> ('I am not certain/sure/positive'), <i>nie jestem przekonany</i> ('I am not convinced'))</p>	<p>Nie jestem pewien, Wysoki Sądzie, czy usatysfakcjonuje zadającego to pytanie (‘I am not sure, Your Honour, if it satisfies the questioner...’)</p>
	<p>‘Uncertain’ adverbials (e.g. <i>(być) może</i> ('maybe'), <i>prawdopodobnie</i> ('probably'), <i>najwyraźniej</i> ('clearly'), <i>najwidoczniej</i> ('apparently'), <i>chyba</i> ('probably'))</p>	<p><i>więc byłbym zaskoczony, bo pewnie bym o tym wiedział, ale nie mogę tego wykluczyć</i> (‘so I would be surprised because I would probably have known about this, but I cannot rule out this possibility’)</p> <p><i>ale to jest też chyba łatwe do stwierdzenia</i> (‘but this is also, I think/probably, easy to ascertain’)</p>

		Hypotheticals/conditional mood (e.g. <i>jeśli/jeżeli</i> ('if'), <i>tak jakby/jakoby</i> ('as if'/'as though'), <i>niejako</i> ('in a way'/'as if'))	<p><i>Była to jakby bezproduktywna i niepotrzebna wizyta</i> (‘This was, as if/in a way, an unproductive and unnecessary visit’)</p> <p><i>że jeśli mam w pamięci jakieś rozmowy z Tomaszem Arabskim, to związane one były raczej z tymi ...</i> (‘that if I remember some conversations with Tomasz Arabski, they were related, I think, to those ...’)</p>	
		Approximators (e.g. <i>gdzieś</i> ('somewhere'/'approximately'), <i>jakieś</i> ('some'))	<p><i>że jeśli mam w pamięci jakieś rozmowy z Tomaszem Arabskim to związane one były raczej z tymi ...</i> (‘that if I remember some conversations with Tomasz Arabski, they were related, I think, to those ...’)</p>	
		Epistemic future (e.g. <i>to będzie</i> ('that will be'))	<p><i>To, co mam w pamięci, to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń</i> (‘What I can remember that will be, I think, the beginning of the year, probably January’)</p>	
	Questions	‘Believing’ questions (alternative questions, polar questions, tag questions, declarative questions)	<p>NOT KNOWING WHETHER</p>  <p>BELIEVING</p>	<p>Alternative question [information-seeking question] <i>Czy takie tematy były poruszane, czy nie były?</i> (‘Were such subjects raised or were they not?’)</p> <p>Polar (yes/no) question [information-seeking question] <i>Czy istniał taki dokument?</i> (‘Did such a document exist?’)</p> <p>Tag question [confirmation-seeking question] <i>To znaczy takie zdarzenia nigdy nie miały miejsca, tak?</i> (‘That is such events never took place, is that right?’)</p> <p>Declarative question [confirmation-seeking question] <i>Rozumiem, że wtedy na Westerplatte w Gdańsku, w Sopocie nie było mowy o obchodach 70. rocznicy w Katyniu?</i> (‘I understand that back then at Westerplatte in Gdańsk, in Sopot there was no talk of the commemoration of the 70th anniversary in Katyn’)</p>